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1. Introduction 
Governments worldwide have tried to control the Internet infrastructure and have adjusted their 
national statutes to enable these actions. Between 1995 and 2011, there were over 600 instances 
of government control over digital networks made by consolidated and unconsolidated 
democracies, authoritarian regimes and fragile states (Howard, Agarwal, & Hussain, 2011). One 
of these actions of governmental control was an Internet shutdown, the most extreme form of 
control over the Internet infrastructure. Earliest findings of this policy go back to 2005, and 
empirical evidence shows three possible ways it is used or might be used:  
a) by governments to deprive their own population from having Internet access, b) by 
governments to deprive different populations (other than their own) from having Internet access 
(as tool of cyber-warfare) and c) by private citizens or organizations to deprive specific 
populations from Internet access. This project will focus on attempts by governments to deprive 
their own populations from having Internet access for reasons of national security. 
2. Internet shutdown: a.k.a. “internet kill switch” 
Shutting down the Internet is defined as a government attempt to stop all Internet activity, and is 
colloquially known as the “Internet kill switch” (Opderbeck, 2012). 
The literature defines both terms from three perspectives: 
a) From a political point of view, as the President’s authority to disconnect commercial and 
private wireless networks when a nation-state faces a national security threat (Liebelson, 
2013) 
b) From a technical point of view, as the attempt to interrupt all Internet and cellular 
communication activity (Johnson, 2011) 
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c) From a cyber-security point of view, as a control mechanism to protect the critical 
infrastructure when a nation-state faces a cyber-attack (Murray, Zeadally, & Flowers, 
2012) 
Despite its name, a kill switch device for the Internet does not actually exist. To stop all Internet 
activity, action must be taken on each of the following elements of the TCP/IP protocol: Internet 
service providers (ISPs), Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), fiber-optic cables, the Domain Name 
System (DNS) and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) (Chang, 2013; Eagleman, 2012). 
3. National Security 
 
National security traditionally refers to the safety of the territory and population of a nation-state 
and by extension, to the policies adopted by its preservation (Paleri, 2008).   
For some academics national security is a “constructed concept” for any nation-state at any given 
time. Multiple factors, like political priorities and the media, will play a role determining what 
issues must be securitized; those issues and are known as “security priorities” (Richards, 2012). 
Seen as the “national interest,” security priorities may change according to the nation-state’s 
geopolitical position or external conflicts (Bobbitt, 2002; Richards, 2012).  
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework used in this project is the “Securitization Theory of the Copenhagen 
School,” also known as “securitization theory”. This theory argues that security is a constructed 
concept, a specific type of politics applicable to a very broad set of issues in certain time (Buzan, 
1998).   
The securitization theory defines security as a “speech act that securitizes,” and constitutes one 
or more “referent objects,” which can be identified as the national interest. This theory has been 
selected for this project because the political speech about securitization has been oriented to 
construct “cyber issues” as “security problems,” rather than regular political, economic, illegal or 
technical problems (Hansen, 2009; Williams, 2003).  
Using the terms of the securitization theory, this study has the purpose of exploring the different 
justifications governments used in shutting down the Internet, an "extreme measure" to protect 
what they consider the "referent object," in order to guarantee the national security of a nation-
state.  
The securitization theoretical framework identifies the following elements: a) Securitizing Actor: 
whoever “securitizes” something, b) Referent Object: thing to be protected, c) Audience: person 
to be convinced with the security speech and d) Extraordinary Measure: action (s) to protect the 
referent object.  
 
5. Research Approach 
This project is driven by two factors: 
a) To challenge the common belief that extreme forms of governmental control are only 
considered or applied by authoritarian regimes. 
b) The need to understand why democracies, self-proclaimed defenders of Internet 
freedom, used or considered using mechanisms of governmental control that these 
governments criticized in their official policy discourse.  
 
6. Multiple Case-Study 
By using the theoretical constructs of the Copenhagen School, this project will take the form of a 
multiple case study of five governments that justified shutting down the Internet, or considered 
doing it, and which provided public justification or legal documents that can be analyzed.  
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Local legislation, political speech concerning government security and the governmental actions 
of these five governments will be compared and examined. 
This proposed study has two stages:  
a) Identification of the Internet shut down episodes worldwide and, 
b) Identification of the justifications governments used to shut down the Internet or to 
consider doing it by analyzing political speech 
The following case studies have been selected:  
 
Type of Regime Well Established 
Democracy 
Hybrid Regimes Shut Down (s), 
Considered (c) 
Australia X  S 
United Kingdom X  C 
United States X  C 
The Russian 
Federation 
 X C 
Venezuela  X S 
 
Table 1. Proposed Case Studies 
 
Governments were classified as democratic or hybrid regimes following the classification of the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (EIU, 2014). The EIU classification, differently from the classic 
approach, evaluates a nation-state “democratic status” by considering different categories 
besides the existence of a national election process: pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of 
government, political participation and political culture. 
7. Research Questions and Data Collection 
The specific research questions that drive this project are: 
RQ1: What is the global scope of the Internet shut down phenomenon? 
RQ2: What justifications do democratic and hybrid regimes use to shut down or to consider 
shutting down the Internet? 
 
Data collection followed a deep Internet research process which analyzed: 
a) News, articles, websites, blogs, and related artifacts (like videos, podcasts and social 
media platforms) related to the participation of private telecomm operators or government 
actions over private Internet infrastructure. 
b) Political speech of the securitizing agents 
c) National statutes: Internet law, Telecommunications law, Cyber security law, National 
security law 
 
The collected documents were analyzed and coded following the categories of the rhetorical 
speech (Purpose, Audience, Persona, Tone, Evidence, Structure, Strategies) by using computer-
assisted qualitative data analysis software ATLAS-ti. The purpose of the coding process was to 
identify the main elements of the theoretical framework as explained in the next paragraph and to 
provide an answer for RQ2. 
 
8. Preliminary Findings and Conclusion 
A preliminary study revealed that, between 2005 and 2015, eleven governments attempted to 
shut down the Internet: a) nine authoritarian regimes, b) a hybrid regime and c) one well-
consolidated democracy. In the same period, two well-consolidated democracies and one hybrid 
regime considered giving legal protection to this form of government control (Cowie, 2014; Mora, 
2014; OpenNet, 2013).  
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Figure 1. Internet Shut Down Cases 
Both, democratic and hybrid regimes justified their actions to control the Internet infrastructure, or 
their intentions to do so, by citing unclear legislations concerning telecommunications and 
national security. Members from the Executive and Legislative branches assumed the role of 
securitizing agents by warning about the Internet as the main threat to the stability of the nation-
state, but the decision to shut down the Internet corresponds to a single authority, usually the 
President. The concept of national interest (or referent object) however, has different meanings 
for different regimes. Concepts of national interest include: a) the critical infrastructure, b) social 
control (in time of political unrest) and c) the communication means of the ruling party.  
The research analysis suggests that the audiences governments attempt to address belong to the 
private sector, specifically, the private sector that owns the critical infrastructure and the private 
sector that controls massive communication means. Governments provided different 
justifications: 
Democratic regimes that considered shutting down the Internet emphasized the protection of the 
critical infrastructure in case of a cyber-attack, however they also consider this extreme policy as 
a mechanism of social control when the public order is threatened. Democratic regimes that did 
use this form of government control claimed that it was an accident and denied their intention to 
use it for political purposes. Their population challenged that explanation. 
Hybrid regimes blame foreign powers for the instability of their regimes and claim an “unclear” 
national interest threatened by the Internet. These regimes focus on maintaining control over the 
national information infrastructure and the protection of the communication platforms of the ruling 
party as their referent object. 
From a policy point of view, these preliminary findings show two characteristics: a) depending 
upon the specific government, the power to order shutting down the Internet is generally 
concentrated in one governmental authority (usually the Executive branch), but accountability 
may vary, and b) there are legal frameworks that “legitimize” explicit or implicitly this extreme form 
of governmental control over the Internet.  
Future research will include the study of the Internet shutdown as a form of cyber-warfare and 
possible implications of this policy on the multi-stakeholder model and the open architecture 
design of the Internet. 
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